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Verena Erlenbusch-Anderson’s Genealogies of Terrorism is an attempt to “loosen the grip 
of habitual frameworks of thought” vis-a-vis terrorism and genealogy.1  In the aftermath 
of so many violent events in our world, debates about the meaning of terrorism follow 
predictable arcs and strategies. Generally, we think that we know terrorism when we see 
it, or, if there is confusion, we think that we can define terrorism via descriptive, 
classificatory, or normative analyses. However, “unquestioned and implicit assumptions 
about what we already recognize as terrorism” shape our perceptions and definitions.2 To 
navigate this impasse, Erlenbusch-Anderson uses Foucault’s method of genealogy to 
excavate the material and discursive conditions of terrorism and to contextualize different 
modes of understanding it today. In the process, she also disrupts some habitual patterns 
of genealogical thought, especially the tendency to mobilize genealogies toward 
normative ends. Very often, normative theorists treat genealogies as the material on which 
they work, abstracting the theorist from their discursive and material conditions and 
implying a distinction between theory and practice. Erlenbusch-Anderson concludes 
Genealogies of Terrorism by considering how theory can serve “as a relay among a plurality 
of concrete practices of resistance and transformation.”3 What it means to be a “relay” is 
a fascinating question in Genealogies of Terrorism. How should genealogists avoid foisting 
prescriptive or speculative theories on others? How should genealogists “derive norms 
from the practices of those who are fighting”?4 In loosening the rigidity of our thought, 
Erlenbusch-Anderson spurs the multiplication of alternative archives and genealogies. 
Through what relays do these genealogies promise “alternative futures […] for those of 
us who […] look for new ways of thinking and knowing”?5 
Erlenbusch-Anderson’s genealogy focuses on a French lineage of the concept of 
terrorism, beginning with its emergence during the French Revolution. Challenging the 
 
1 Verena Erlenbusch-Anderson, Genealogies of Terrorism: Revolution, State Violence, Empire (2018), 20. 
2 Ibid., 3. 
3 Ibid., 182. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 184. 
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metaphysical tendency to treat the Revolution as the origin or birthplace of terrorism, she 
maps the term’s contestation amidst a broader shift towards biopolitical rationalities. In a 
short period of time (1794-1797), the meaning of terrorism exhibits a striking variability, 
referring to charismatic individuals, systems of government, philosophical doctrines, and 
social identities. In 1794, the term is coined by Jean-Lambert Tallien to describe 
Robespierre’s charismatic violent reign, functioning like the phrases “Hitler’s Germany” 
or “Stalin’s Russia.”6 Within weeks of this formulation, journalist Francois-Noel Babeuf 
redeploys terrorism as a description of a system of government that is not specific to 
Robespierre but is, in fact, operative in the Tallien’s own Thermidorian government. “That 
is, Babuef took Tallien’s description of terrorism as a particular form of government at 
face value and suggested that the new political leadership conformed to its own 
understanding of terrorism.”7 By separating terrorism from the person, Babeuf’s 
discourse allows for its philosophical and identitarian meanings as well. If Thermidorian 
rule was the true terrorism then perhaps being labelled a terrorist by the government was 
not a bad thing. Perhaps terrorism is the “demand for freedom, the rights of man, 
democracy, justice and equality.”8  
This explosion of contestation over the meaning of terrorism takes place against the 
backdrop of a transition from sovereign to biopolitical rationality, more specifically from 
raison d’état to raison économique. Robespierre’s reign of terror reflects the raison d’état, a 
mode of governing that is centrally concerned with the preservation of the state. For 
Robespierre, the idea that the state must be preserved by any means necessary helped 
establish the legitimacy of his revolutionary government and justified his use of violence 
against external enemies. However, as the radical tumult of Robespierre’s reign makes 
clear, raison état operated in tension with other political rationalities. Tallien’s critique of 
Robespierre’s reign as terrorism reflects raison économique, a rationality which made the 
sovereign subservient to the laws that governed society. As a biopolitical rationality, 
raison économique is concerned with the natural and stable functioning of society. It uses 
law as a tactic of regulation and shifts its attention from external to internal enemies. 
According to Erlenbusch-Anderson, it is this shift of rationality that helps us make sense 
of terrorism as a “mechanism of social defense […] a way of discriminating between good 
citizens and bad citizens, between those who could live and those who must die to ensure 
the health and salvation of the nation.”9  The French revolution was not the origin or 
birthplace of terrorism in any way that isolates its proper meaning as charismatic, 
systematic, philosophical or identitarian. Rather, terrorism is as contested as the 
upheavals around the Thermidorian reaction and as shifting as the biopolitical 
rationalities that lead to our historical present. 
In a later discussion, Erlenbusch-Anderson illustrates how terrorism as a dispositif of 
social defense is “taken up, transformed and overlaid with new meanings” during the 
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French colonization of Algeria. According to 19th century biopolitical rationalities, “the 
colonization of Algeria was necessary for France’s internal well-being and external 
reputation”; the colony was to serve as a place to dispose of French criminal elements as 
well as a way to restore national glory after the fall of the French Empire.10 With the 
invasion of Algiers in 1830, French colonial forces transformed this biopolitical rationality 
into a policy of “peace enforcement” via vast surveillance mechanisms and biological 
logics of racist subjugation. While the armed resistance movement understood “peace 
enforcement” to be another episode of the colonial war begun in 1830, French colonial 
forces understood problems in Algeria to be of an internal order. In their view, “military 
action was no longer justified as a method of subjugating a foreign population but as a 
way of maintaining internal order in the face of a terrorist threat.”11 Framed by a shared 
biopolitical discourse and its “tactical reversibility,” colonial and resistance forces deploy 
opposing understandings of terrorism. Today, the Algerian revolution is remembered in 
similarly divergent ways, as an “exemplar of anti-colonial struggle” for resistance 
movements on the one hand and an exemplar of counter-terrorism strategies for aspiring 
imperial states on the other.  
Despite these patterns of historical memory, Erlenbusch-Anderson’s genealogy shows 
that there are no simple continuities to be drawn between the Algerian Revolution and 
post-9/11 United States. While the U.S. military uses Gillo Pontocorvo’s 1965 movie The 
Battle of Algiers to teach troops about terrorism and counterinsurgency, Erlenbusch-
Anderson maintains that terrorism today is differently synthetic in that many senses of 
terrorism (charismatic, systemic, doxastic, identitarian, strategic, etc.) coalesce in the 
flexible mechanism of social defense while not being captured by a single definition. 
Quoting Nietzsche on synthetic definitions, she maintains that “one can still perceive how 
in each individual case [of terrorism] the elements of the synthesis change their value and 
reorganize themselves accordingly, so that now one, now another element comes to the 
fore and dominates at the expense of the rest.”12  In this heterogeneous field of rearranging 
elements, the biopolitical rationality of social defense still enframes its contestation. 
Reading the changing National Security Strategy documents from 1987 to 2002 as an 
illustration of the flexibility of this heterogenous field, Erlenbusch-Anderson shows how 
the specter of an always present terrorist threat works to justify vast invasive state powers 
in the U.S.. And despite the widespread tendency to treat the events of 9/11 as a historical 
caesura, Erlenbusch-Anderson demonstrates that the contemporary dispositif of social 
defense had, by the mid-90s, already generated the techniques of the “war on terror.” 9/11 
provided the occasion to expand those techniques and make them permanent.13  
Genealogy tends to subvert historical knowledge like this. By excavating how things 
have been and could be otherwise, it unsettles well-worn assumptions and maps how 
things that appear unproblematic are actually problematic. Like Foucault, Erlenbusch-
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Anderson does not pretend that genealogy solves problems or delivers normative 
judgments. Instead, genealogy offers spurs to questioning as well as a “sort of tool box 
through which others can rummage to find a tool with which they can do what seems 
good to them, in their domain.”14 Erlenbusch-Anderson emphasizes the use of 
genealogical method as a tool and not just the application of concepts such as biopolitics, 
governmentality, or subjectivation. Divorced from his strategy of careful historical 
excavation, the appropriation of Foucault’s concepts for critical analysis is often in tension 
with his work. However, even contemporary genealogists can drift from the spirit of 
Foucault’s text. Erlenbusch-Anderson cautions those genealogists that protect some 
concepts while excavating others as well as those genealogists that attempt to confidently 
pivot to prescriptive normative theorizing. The place of genealogy is itself subject to 
genealogical concerns, and reserving some concepts or theoretical gestures from the 
movement of genealogical critique threatens to “perpetuate currently dominant 
conceptualizations of and solutions to terrorism.”15 Moreover, Foucault objected to the 
image of the intellectual abstracted from their discursive and material context, acting as a 
“prophet or lawgiver who imposes normative prescriptions about what is to be done on 
the practices of those who fight on the ground.”16 As Foucault put it, theory “does not 
express, translate, or apply a practice, it is a practice”; “what I say should be considered 
as proposals, ‘games on offer.’”17 Erlenbusch-Anderson interprets this as the promotion 
of a normative political theory that “excavates or helps excavate” from concrete practices 
and relays among resistant concrete practices.18  
Erlenbusch-Anderson’s critical survey of Foucauldian genealogical research is a fair 
accounting of the field, capturing dominant contemporary trends in the literature. For 
instance, in the Anglophone feminist reception of his work, Foucault’s concepts 
(power/knowledge, discipline, or subjectivation) are more widely applied than his 
methods of genealogy or problematization. Judith Butler’s early writings are particularly 
influential in this respect, as Butler’s social theory links a Foucauldian understanding of 
power with psychoanalytic and phenomenological approaches to embodied subjectivity. 
In “Herculine Barbin and the omission of biopolitics from Judith Butler’s gender 
genealogy,” Jemima Repo explores the striking ways that Butler’s theoretical model 
evades the genealogy of biopolitics that enframes so many of her favorite Foucauldian 
concepts. On Repo’s reading, Butler’s evasion of the genealogy of biopolitics contributes 
to the abstraction of her gender theory from “gender itself.”  In her own genealogical 
investigation, The Biopolitics of Gender, Repo traces the term’s construction in 20th century 
psychiatry to show that gender is a biopolitical project complicit with deadly white cis-
normative discourses of “abnormality, sexual difference, and biological foundations.”19 
Interestingly, when Repo considers the possibility of feminist theory without or beyond 
 
14 Ibid., 166. 
15 Ibid., 177. 
16 Ibid., 178. 
17 Quoted in ibid., 179. 
18 Ibid., 182. 
19 Jemima Repo, The Biopolitics of Gender (2016), 104. 
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gender, she engages in the kind of normative argumentation that Erlenbusch-Anderson 
interrogates in Genealogies of Terrorism. According to Erlenbusch-Anderson, the 
elimination of ambiguous, flexible terms like gender or terrorism “will not eliminate the 
political rationalities, interests, and structures that make it possible and necessary, but 
will instead generate different concepts that allow for the preservation of the mechanisms 
of social control.”20 In her view, the normative call to eliminate or abolish a term is another 
way that genealogists abstract their work from concrete practices. Instead of issuing 
normative proposals, Erlenbusch-Anderson suggests that genealogies act as “relays 
among a plurality of concrete practices of resistance and transformation.”21  
Although the notion of “relay” is not extensively developed in Genealogies of Terrorism, 
there are some models in Foucault’s oeuvre beyond his genealogies themselves. For 
instance, his Parallel Lives series comes to mind. The series includes Herculine Barbin (Being 
the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth Century Hermaphrodite) and I, Pierre Rivière: 
Having Slaughtered my Mother, Sister, and Brother: A Case of Parricide in the Nineteenth 
Century as well as the introductory essay “The Lives of Infamous Men,” a meditation on 
the experience of textual encounter in the archive. Importantly, the Barbin and Rivière 
volumes are dossiers that gather or relay collections of texts together as provocations to 
investigation and reflection—memoirs, novellas, medical and legal documents, 
newspaper articles, and notes. In “Lives of Infamous Men,” Foucault describes the 
invitation to genealogy as staging an encounter with texts that form part of the 
“dramaturgy of the real […] One won’t see a collection of verbal portraits here, but traps, 
weapons, cries, gestures, attitudes, ruses, intrigues for which words were instruments.”22 
Or, as Lynne Huffer describes it, “Foucault’s infamous human lives appear as ashes or 
dried plants and flowers organized in an herbarium […] Just as fossils appear as pictorial 
poems in the sedimented archive of nature, so too archival ‘poem-lives” appear in asylum 
reports and police reports.”23 In her discussion of relays, Erlenbusch-Anderson points to 
the poem-lives that appear in Kevin Olson’s careful genealogy of the tricolor cockade, 
appreciating the ways that “imaginaries of popular political power can be both explicitly 
articulated in speech and implicit in political practices.”24 The archive is not total and there 
is a need for engaged empirical critique that explores how lives entangle with power, how 
power “in striking down a life and turning it to ashes, makes it emerge, like a flash, out of 
the anonymous murmur of beings who pass without a trace.”25 The Parallel Lives series is 
an invitation to excavate these entanglements, and it is a model of the activity of relaying. 
Erlenbusch-Anderson concludes Genealogies of Terrorism by looking to Gary Wilder’s 
politics of radical literalism as a model for normative reconstruction in relation to 
 
20 Erlenbusch-Anderson, Genealogies of Terrorism: Revolution, State Violence, Empire, 171. 
21 Ibid., 182. 
22 Michel Foucault, “The Life of Infamous Men,” in Michel Foucault: Power, Truth, Strategy ed. Meagan Morris 
and Paul Patton, (1979), 78-79. 
23 Lynne Huffer, “Foucault’s Fossils: Life Itself and the Return to Nature in Feminist Philosophy,” Foucault 
Studies 20 (2015), 139. 
24 Genealogies of Terrorism: Revolution, State Violence, Empire, 168. 
25 Huffer, “Foucault’s Fossils: Life Itself and the Return to Nature in Feminist Philosophy,” 139. 
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genealogy. By “radical literalism,” Wilder means to describe “normative strategies that 
are fully immanent in a given problem.”26  Aime Cesaire, Leopold Senghor and Frantz 
Fanon are all credited with performing radically literal normative interventions in that 
they engaged with “transformative possibilities sedimented in existing arrangements.”27 
What does it mean for these possibilities to be sedimented or “fully immanent in a given 
problem”? If the archive is not total, immanence is ambiguous, incomplete and 
complicated, sedimented like a fossil or herbarium, to borrow Huffer’s imagery. 
Moreover, any given problem (e.g., gender or terrorism) is entangled with other problems 
in ways that multiply the field and shape of immanence. Perhaps this is the point or the 
exciting part of radical literalism for the genealogist; tracing the disseminated and subtle 
field and shape of existing arrangements. As Genealogies of Terrorism shows us so deftly, 
one need not foray into speculative philosophy or prescriptive law-giving in order to 
experiment in creative ways in the archives and relay beyond them.  
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